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COMMENTS
ADMISSIBILITY OF DNA STATISTICAL DATA:
A PROLIFERATION OF MISCONCEPTION
INTRODUCTION

Less than two years ago, DNA' evidence2 was being exalted as the
"magic bullet" for courtroom convictions. 3 With statistical probabilities of
a random match as high as one in several hundred billion,4 DNA evidence
seemed the ultimate indicator of guilt or innocence. 5 Prosecutors and judges
alike rested heavily upon its apparent infallibility. 6 Lauded by some as the
"second coming" of the fingerprint,7 DNA use in the courtroom has been
said to be the "single greatest advance in the 'search for truth'. . since the
advent of cross-examination." 8 Prosecutorial use supports such boasts.
Over the last six years DNA evidence has been used in more than 500
criminal cases in 49 states. 9

1. "DNA" is short for "deoxyribonucleic acid," the chemical compound found in
chromosomes within every cell of the human body which contains a nucleus. DNA use for
identification purposes is often referred to as DNA identity testing, profiling, fingerprinting,
typing or genotyping--all of which concern the characterization of one's genetic makeup. Lome
T. KIRBY, DNA FINGERPRINTING, AN INTRODUCTION 1 (1990).
2. DNA evidence evolves from a process by which a suspect's genetic structure is identified,
compared with samples taken from a crime scene, and, if there is a match, subjected to a
statistical analysis to determine the frequency of the particular genetic structure (DNA) within
the general population. People v. Barney, 8 Cal. App. 4th 798, 805 (1992).
3. Edward Humes, The DNA Wars, THE Los ANGELES MAGAZINE, Nov. 29, 1992, at 23
("DNA evidence was first presented to the courts and the public: as a magic bullet."); see
Jonathan J. Koehler, DNA Matches and Statistics: Important Questions, Surprising Answers,
JUDICATURE,

February-March 1993, at 222 n.1.

4. Current statistical methods can produce odds of up to 1 in 739 billion. Ira Pilchen,
FederalReport and Court Rulings Intensify DNA Evidence Debate, JUDICATURE, June-June 1992,
at 41.
5. See Humes, supra note 3, at 21 (DNA evidence "[tlouted as an infallible method of
identifying criminals ..... ")see also William C. Thompson & Simon Ford, DNA Testing:
Debate Update, TRIAL, Apr. 1992, at 52 (DNA testing was "widely hailed as a crime-fighting
panacea, capable of infallibly identifying the source of biological samples taken from crime
scenes.").
6. Rorie Sherman, DNA Unraveling, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 1, 1993, at 1.
7. See Lisa Bouwer Hansen, Comment, Stemming the DNA Tide: A Case for Quality
Control Guidelines, 16 HAMLINE L. REV. 211 n.5 (1992); see also Mark D. Stolorow & George
W. Clarke, Forensic DNA Testing: A New Dimension in Criminal Evidence Gains Broad
Acceptance, THE PROSECUTOR, Spring 1992, at 24 ("DNA typing constitutes the most powerful
forensic tool since the 19th Century discovery that the fingerprints of no two persons are the
same.").
8. People v. Wesley, 533 N.Y.S.2d 643, 644 (N.Y. 1988).
9. George W. Clarke, DNA 7yping: A Scientific Tool Enters the Courtroom, Women of
Conviction, Spring-Summer 1993, at 8.
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In the last year and a half, however, the magic bullet has lost some of
its luster. Supreme and appellate courts in several jurisdictions have refused
to admit DNA evidence.'" Specifically, those courts rejected the population
frequency data" used in conjunction with DNA evidence" because the
methods used for the statistical calculations are not generally accepted in the
scientific community.

3

Citing a report issued in April 1992 by the National Research Council
("NRC"), several courts found that a legitimate scientific dispute exists
between population frequency calculation methods.' 4 Some of these courts
have suggested that the more conservative statistical calculations offered by
the NRC report should be used in place of the numbers generated by the FBI
and other labs.' 5 Part of this conflict between statistical calculation methods,

10. Id. at 9; Sherman, supra note 6, at 1. See e.g., People v. Barney, 8 Cal. App. 4th 798
(1992); People v. Pizarro, 10 Cal. App. 4th 57 (1992); State v. Vandebogart, 616 A.2d 483
(N.H. 1992); Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 596 N.E.2d 311 (Mass. 1992); People v. Atoigue,
1992 WL 245628 (D. Guam App. Div.).
11. Population frequency data refers to the theoretical probability that a randomly selected
person from a target population would genetically match the trace evidence as well as the
defendant. Koehler, supra note 3, at 224. The probability of a DNA match does not refer to
the likelihood that the defendant is the source of the trace nor does it indicate the likelihood that
the defendant committed the crime. Id. It merely assists juries in assessing the probative
significance of a DNA match. Id.
12. Clarke, supra note 9, at 9. The matching of a pair of DNA prints to the exclusion of
all other matches is part of the evidence which is supplemented by the probability that such a
match would occur. Several courts have concluded that without the probability data, DNA
evidence is inadmissible. See People v. Barney, 8 Cal. App. 4th 798, 817 (1992) (without a
match probability, a match "means nothing."); United States v. Yee, 134 F.R.D. 161, 181
(N.D.Ohio 1991) ("Without the probability assessment the jury does not know what to make of
the fact that the patterns match: the jury does not know whether the [matching] pairs are as
common as pictures with two eyes, or as unique as the Mona Lisa."); State v. Cauthron, 846
P.2d 502, 516 (Wash. 1993) (finding testimony of a DNA match not helpful to the jury without
probability estimates of such a match); see also People v. Atoigue, 1992 WL 245628, at *3.
13. See Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 596 N.E.2d 311, 316 (Mass. 1992); State v.
Vandebogart, 616 A.2d 483, 494-95; People v. Barney, 8 Cal. App. 4th 798, 811-14 (1992);
State v. Bible, 858 P.2d 1152, 1188-89 (Ariz. 1993); People v. Atoigue, 1992 WL 245628
(D.Guam App.Div.). Additionally, Courts have excluded DNA evidence, with its spectacular
statistics and unimaginable probabilities obtained from the population frequency data has been
held inadmissible due to its intimidating effect upon juries. See State v. Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d
422, 428 (Minn. 1989) (holding DNA population frequency data inadmissible since jurors, when
confronted with technology as complex as DNA typing, may give undue weight and deference
to DNA statistical evidence); see also Koehler, supra note 3, at 229 n.24.
14. See Breadmore, 596 N.E.2d at 316; Vandebogart, 616 A.2d at 494-95; Barney, 8 Cal.
App. 4th at 811-14; Bible, 858 P.2d 1152, 1188-89 (Ariz. 1993); Atoigue, 1992 WL 245628
(D.Guam App.Div.).
15. Sherman, supra note 6, at 30. The method used by the FBI and many commercial
laboratories is known as the "multiplication rule" which, as noted earlier, can produce odds of
a DNA match as high as 1 in 739 billion. Pilchen, supra note 4, at 41. The method endorsed
by the NRC report-which envisions the possibility that matches within ethnic groups may occur
with greater frequency-produces more conservative numbers through modified calculations.
DNA Technology in Forensic Science, National Research Council (U.S.), National Academy
of Sciences, 1992, at 80-86 [hereinafter DNA Technology]. A DNA calculation method is
termed 'conservative' if the estimated probability of a DNA match is, on average, larger than
the actual one so that any weight placed on the estimate would favor the suspect. Id. at 78.
Thus, overestimating a particular genetic type's frequency in a target population would make the
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stems from the NRC's report itself. The NRC report, written by a 12member committee of scientific and legal experts over a two-year period,
was originally hoped to end any debate on the admissibility of DNA
evidence. However, the report was unclear in its message. While it
endorses the use of DNA evidence in general, it raises concerns about the
statistical assumptions necessary for the admission of DNA evidence. 6
Since courts have traditionally deferred to pronouncements from the
National Academy of Sciences, the NRC report has consistently been cited
in judicial opinions.' 7 Perhaps due to the complex nature of DNA evidence,
the reaction to the report's proposals have been subject to various interpretations by the courts.' 8
Part I of this Comment provides a brief introduction to the theories

behind DNA evidence and how it can be used as evidence in the court room.
Part II examines the latest series of challenges opponents have levied against

DNA evidence focusing specifically on the population statistical evidence.
In addition, this section presents a comprehensive analysis of the population
substructuring theory. Part III gives an overview of the case law regarding
these latest attacks starting with a brief description of the various admissibility standards for scientific evidence and ending with a perspective on the
California experience. Part IV examines two implications affecting the future
admissibility of DNA evidence. First, the section proposes that courts
realize that a conservative consensus among scientists is currently possible.
Second, the section analyzes a major breakdown in the argument of some
DNA critics who influenced the NRC report.

estimate conservative. Id.
16. Regarding the technology behind DNA analysis, the report concluded that the principles
underlying DNA identification are sound and further admissibility hearings on such technology
were unnecessary. DNA Technology, supranote 15, at 144.
17. Sherman, supra note 6, at 30. The National Academy of Sciences is a branch of the
National Academy of Sciences.
18. See Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 596 N.E.2d 311, 316 (Mass. 1992) (holding DNA
evidence inadmissible due to a significant debate among scientists over statistical data); State v.
Vandebogart, 616 A.2d 483, 494-95 (N.H. 1992) (remanded to determine whether a
conservative estimate-as recommended by the NRC Report-can be generally accepted); State
v. Pierce 597 N.E.2d 107, 115 (Ohio 1992) (holding DNA population frequency data admissible
because the court must let the jury weigh the evidence, make credibility determinations, and
determine the facts); People v. Wesley, 589 N.Y.S.2d 197, 201 (N.Y. 1992) (DNA population
frequency data admissible and any attacks are matters of weight for jury consideration); U.S.
v. Porter, 618 A.2d 629 (D.C. App. 1992) (holding DNA population frequency data
inadmissible due to controversy surrounding assumptions upon which the calculations were
made). In California particularly, the NRC report has added fuel to the controversy of the
admissibility of DNA evidence. See People v. Barney, 8 Cal. App. 4th 798, 819 (1992) (finding
disagreement among scientists "significant in both number and expertise" and subsequently
holding the population frequency data inadmissible); People v. Pizarro, 10 Cal. App. 4th 57,
77-83 (1992) (trial court decision reversed and remanded after a review of the NRC's
recommendations). On the federal level, see United States v. Yee, 134 F.R.D. 161 (N.D. Ohio
1991).
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I. THE THEORY OF DNA TYPING

A. DeoxyribonucleicAcid (DNA)
DNA is the chemical dispatcher of genetic information, essentially the
"blueprint" of life.' 9 DNA is composed of two parallel strands of repeated
sequences of phosphate and sugar which are coiled into a double helix.,,
These strands are linked together like rungs on a ladder by a series of
molecules called nucleotide bases. 2' Each rung consists of two bases forming
what are called "base pairs. "I There are four of these bases,' which by
combination, create about 3.3 billion base pairs per set of chromosomes. 24
Except for reproductive cells, the sequence of these base pairs is identical in
every cell in the human body which has a nucleus.'
Each base pair
sequence has its own position, or locus, on a chromosome.2 Each particular
sequence of base pairs is called an allele and occupies its own locus on the

chromosome.' Of the 3.3 billion base pairs, 99.9 percent of the sequences
(or alleles) are identical in every person.' The remaining base pairs, about
3.3 million molecule combinations, are different for all individuals-except
identical twins.29 A locus located on one of these variable sections is said to
be a polymorphic locus. 30 The alleles located at such loci have base pairs
that repeat varying number of times. 3' Because of this variation, no two
19. Clarke, supra note 9, at 6. Every human cell with a nucleus contains a set of
chromosomes and each chromosome contains thousands of genes, each of which occupies a
particular location on the chromosome. Barney, 8 Cal. App. 4th at 805. The molecular
component of the genes and the chromosome is DNA. Id. DNA serves as a blueprint for
assembling amino acids into proteins and more importantly for identity testing, it serves as a
template for cell reproduction. KIRBY, supra note 1, at 11; see generally Office of Technology
Assessment, Genetic Witness: Forensic Uses of DNA Tests (1990) [hereinafter Genetic
Witness].
20. Genetic Witness, supranote 19, at 3; D.H. Kaye, The Admissibility ofDNA Testing, 13
CARDOZO L. REV. 353, 353 (1991).
21. Kaye, supra note 20, at 353.
22. Barney, 8 Cal. App. 4th at 805.
23. These bases are known as adenine, thymine, cytosine and guanine and are commonly
referred by their abbreviations A, C, G, and T. KIRBY, supra note 1, at 12.
24. Genetic Witness, supra note 19, at 3.
25. Clarke, supra note 9, at 6.
26. KIRBY, supra note 1, at 334.

27. People v. Axell, 235 Cal. App. 3d 836, 845-46 (1991).
28. Genetic Witness, supra note 19, at 3-4. The repeated duplication of these DNA strands
is known as "tandem repeat." KIRBY, supranote 1, at 341. These portions of DNA which are
identical in all people are responsible for shared traits such as arms and legs. People v. Barney,
8 Cal. App. 4th 798, 806 (1992).
29. Barney, 8 Cal. App. 4th at 806.
30. Id.
31. Id. Alleles that are composed of a variable number of tandem repeats, i.e., the base
pairs repeat for varying numbers of times, are known as "variable number tandem repeats" or
VNTR." KIRBY, supranote 1, at 342. These portions of DNA are responsible for a person's
individual traits. People v. Axell, 235 Cal. App. 3d 836, 845 (1991)
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human beings have identical sequences of all base pairs.32 It is this tiny
amount of variation in human DNA sequences that allows forensic scientists
to use DNA evidence to identify a particular person.
B. DNA Detection Methods
Although there are several methods to detect DNA variations, the most
common procedure is known as restriction fragment length polymorphism
(RFLP) analysis.34 Basically, the RFLP analysis consists of extracting DNA

from biological evidence,35 breaking the DNA strands into fragments with a
restriction enzyme,3 6 and pouring the fragments into an electrified gel, which

displays the fragments according to size. The fragments are then transferred
to a nylon membrane through a process which maintains the order of the
fragments in the gel.37 A "probe"38 is eventually added to the membrane

which bonds with DNA fragments sharing the same base pair sequences
which creates a radioactive tag for that specific fragment.39 Next, the
membrane is exposed to X-ray film and the radioactive tags appear as a
band on the film, similar to a barcode. 4° This enables one to measure the
fragments which contain varying sections and identify the specific alleles.41
Since the DNA strands for a particular person will always fragment in the

32. Axell, 235 Cal. App. 3d at 845. Because the length of the alleles formed from the
repeats varies from person to person, individual identification can be achieved by measuring the
allele lengths at various loci. Id. at 845-46.
33. Clarke, supra note 9, at 6. Because the probability of two people having the same
VNTR is low, the examination of a person's VNTR over several loci reduces the probability of
a random match. KIRBY, supra note 1, at 2. It is the small probability (up to 1 in 739 billion)
of such a match that "identifies" the individual with the DNA print.
34. Genetic Witness, supranote 19, at 4. Another common method for DNA identification
is polymerase chain reaction ("PCR"). The great advantage of PCR over RFLP is that it can
identify a DNA type from a sample with 1,000 times less DNA than required for RFLP
analysis. Id. at 69. PCR starts off procedurally similar to RFLP where cells are extracted of
their DNA. William C. Thompson & Simon Ford, DNA Typing: Acceptance and Weight of the
New Genetic Identification Tests, 75 VA. L. REv. 45, 76. (1989). Yet, it differs in that the tiny
amounts of DNA are then "amplified" or reproduced millions of times before being spotted on
to the nylon membrane. Id. at 76-77.
35. Since all cells in the body share the same DNA, tissue from any part of the body (hair,
blood, skin, or semen) can be used for DNA identity testing. KIRBY, supra note 1, at 14.
36. Restriction enzymes cut the DNA strands into fragments at specific locations along the
base pair sequences. Id. at 338. A different enzyme usually cuts the strand at a different
location. Id.
37. Thompson & Ford, supra note 34, at 71.
38. A probe is a recorded sequence of bases which is radioactively tagged enabling it to be
traced once it is added to the DNA fragments. Id. at 71-72.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 74.
41. Hansen, supra note 7, at 216. This process or step is known as "matching" and consists
of comparing DNA patterns produced by the processing with DNA patterns of biological
material found at the crime scene.
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same place (with the same restriction enzyme), an individual can be identified
based on the varying lengths of his or her DNA fragments.42
C. Population Frequenciesand the MultiplicationRule
Once a conclusive DNA print has been obtained, two possible outcomes
exist depending on whether the DNA print matches the sample, (i.e. the
suspect's blood).43 If the print does not match the sample, then the
evidence may be declared exculpatory.' If it does match the sample, then
it must be determined what the likelihood is that such a match occurs by
chance and that the suspect is not linked to the sample.45 To establish this,
it is necessary to estimate the frequency within the population of allele
distribution at each of several loci.' Since obtaining enough empirical data
on which to calculate a frequency is largely impossible (due to the necessary
size of such a database), population geneticists must make the assumption
that each particular allele match within a locus is independent from the other
loci. 47 Because each pair of matching alleles is assumed to be statistically
independent," the frequencies (or odds) of each match are multiplied
together to come up with a probability for the entire DNA pattern.49 This

42. Thompson & Ford, supra note 34, at 67-68.
43. Ranajit Chakraborty & Kenneth Kidd, The Utility ofDNA Typing in Forensic Work, 254
SCIENCE 1735, 1735 (1991).
44. Id. ("No population genetic issues arise in interpreting this outcome."); see DNA
Technology, supra note 15, at 75 (a "nonmatch" or "exclusion" is sufficient proof that the two
samples came from different origins).
45. Chakraborty & Kidd, supra note 43, at 1735. A DNA print "cannot be interpreted with
regard to inclusion until the population frequencies of the patterns have been established." DNA
Technology, supra note 15, at 75.
46. DNA Technology, supra note 15, at 75. Population estimates could be accomplished
through an actual counting method which involves counting the occurrences in a random sample
of a certain population and then applying classical statistical formulas, however, due to a lack
of such empirical data, DNA analysis uses theoretical assumptions based on population genetics.
Id. at 76.
47. Id. at 77. The multiplication rule cannot be used accurately where the factors (alleles)
are not independent. In population genetics, the independence of allele frequencies is shown by
the existence of Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium. KIRBY, supra note 1, at 169. Hardy-Weinberg
law states that in a large random mating population, where no disturbances by outside influences
such as mutation, migration, or selection exist, the allele frequencies at specific loci remain
constant from generation to generation. Id.
48. Independence means that the occurrence of A does not affect the estimate B. KIRBY,
supra note 1, at 165. Thus, the frequency of a particular allele at one locus does not influence
the estimate of an allele frequency at another locus. The probability that each will occur
together is simply the product of each allele's probability, i.e., the frequency of an allele at
locus A multiplied by the frequency of an allele at locus B yields the frequency, or probability
that the alleles will occur together.
49. For example, one VNTR sequence may occur in 1 in 50 people. Another may occur
in 1 in 100 people and another in 1 in 14 people. Multiplying the odds of all three or more such
sequences generates extremely small probabilities of a match, such as 1 in 100,000 to 1 in
several billion. Increasing the probability can be done by adding another locus to the
calculation. DNA Technology, supranote 15, at 76; Humes, supra note 3, at 54, 56.
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statistical procedure is know as the "multiplication rule"5' and the lower the
frequency it produces, the more certainty is associated with an individual's
DNA identification. However, independence of an allele match within a
locus carries with it the assumption that population frequency data is sampled
from a common gene pool." The validity of the multiplication rule's
results depends on the absence of any subpopulations52 within the gene pool
of the general population. 3
II. THE SCIENTIFIC ATTACK: POPuLATION SUBGROUPS
Scientific questioning of the population frequency data began prior to the
NRC report. 4 In December 1991, a critical article written by two population geneticists, Dr. Richard C. Lewontin of Harvard University and Dr.
Daniel L. Hartl of Washington University, appeared in the journal Science.55 This article disputed the validity of the assumptions used in
conjunction with the multiplication rule to support DNA frequency estimates. 56 Appearing in the same issue of Science, however, a rebuttal article
by Dr. Chakraborty and Dr. Kenneth Kidd of Yale University explicitly
challenged the charges made by Lewontin and Hartl?
A. The Lewontin and Hartl Challenge
The article by Lewontin and Hart extends beyond former areas of DNA
debate, such as the reliability of the tests or validity of DNA matches.
Instead, they attack the huge probabilities and statistics underlying the
population frequency data necessary for the admission of DNA evidence. 8
Specifically, they question whether the multiplication rule actually yields a
"valid and reliable estimate of the probability of matching between 'random'

50. See generally DNA Technology, supra note 15, at 76-77.
51. Id. at 77. A freely mixing population allows a homogenous distribution of genes from
which all members more or less share the same genetic make-up. Id. at 81-82; Huber, Battling
Chromosomes: Fighting "DNA Fingerprinting"Evidence, ARMY LAw., June 1993, at 39.
52. Subpopulations, like Italians, for instance, are ethnic groups that share a more common
gene pool than the general population due to intermarriage within the group. The existence of
such subgroups within the general population it is argued may affect the accuracy of the
multiplication rule. DNA Technology, supra note 15, at 79.
53. Id.
54. Clark, supra note 9, at 9.
55. See Richard C. Lewontin & Daniel L. Hartl, Population Genetics in Forensic DNA
Typing, 254 SCIENCE 1745 (1991).
56. Id. at 1746-1749.
57. Clarke, supra note 9, at 9; Chakraborty & Kidd, supra note 43, at 1735.
58. Lewontin & Hartd, supra note 58, at 1749 ("As currently calculated, the [population
frequency] estimates may be in error, possibly by two or more orders of magnitude... Hence,
probability estimates like 1 in 738,000,000,000,000, however they are calculated, are terribly
misleading....").
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individuals. ,59 The problem with the multiplication rule, the authors argue,
is the assumption that population frequencies of DNA sequences with each
locus are independent.'
Current methods for estimating population
frequencies assume that Caucasians, Blacks, and Hispanics are homogeneous
populations6 undergoing random mating.62 Such an assumption, Lewontin
and Hartl claim however, is unjustified because it ignores "a considerable
body of evidence" indicating genetically diverse subpopulations exist within
these larger populations.63
They allege that within large population groups, such as Caucasians or
Hispanics, subpopulations exist with significantly different allele frequencies
from other subgroups within the same population. 4 For example, the
article contends that there is "on average, one-third more genetic variation
among Irish, Spanish, Italians, Slavs, Swedes, and other subpopulations, than
there is, on the average between Europeans, Asians, Africans, Amerinds, and
Oceanians. "65
Genetic variation among such subgroups, concluded
Lewontin & Hart, will likely be maintained, even in the U.S., because such
subgroups tend to intermarry rather than forming a "biological melting
pot."66 Accordingly, Lewontin and Hartl question whether it is legitimate
to use such reference populations for allele frequency estimations and
whether it is legitimate to multiply these frequencies to estimate the
probability of a DNA match.67
They contend that because "Caucasian" Americans share ancestry from
many genetically diverse European subgroups, a single "Caucasian"
reference database for estimating the probabilities of a DNA match is
misleading.6" Rather, to produce accurate probabilities each subgroup must
have its own reference database which is computed separately from the larger
population frequencies.69 Consequently, multiplying frequencies across
several loci (according to the multiplication rule) is inappropriate.7' Since
59. Id. at 1746.
60. Id.
61. Single pooled reference population databases, such as "Caucasians," are used to estimate
allele frequencies of each individual VNTR. Id. at 1747.
62. Id. at 1746; "Random mating," in the sense used here, means that individuals do not
choose a mate based directly on physical or genetic characteristics. Id.
63. Id.

64. Id.
65. Id. at 1747.
66. Id.; Leslie Roberts, Fight Erupts Over DNA Fingerprintinq,254

SCIENCE

1721, 1723

(1991). According to Lewontin and Hartl, genetic substructure within mixed populations can

also exist if immigrants to the conglomerate population carried over the genetic differentiation
of their ancestors or if only a few generations have passed since the mixing. Lewontin & Hartl,
supra note 58, at 1747. In addition, their data indicated that all three conditions occur with the
Caucasian, Black, and Hispanic populations within the U.S. Id.
67. Lewontin & Hartl, supra note 58, at 1747.

68. Id. at 1748.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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the subpopulations allegedly have different allele frequencies, they require
separate multiplication within each subgroup. 7' Thus, the minuscule
probability estimates under the multiplication rule are "terribly misleading"
and "unreliable," claim Lewontin and Hartl, because the labs have not
taken into account the effect of population substructuring. 7 Based on these
observations, Lewontin and Hart concluded that use of DNA typing in the
courtroom must wait until extensive study of population subgroups is
completed.7'
B. The Chakraborty and Kidd Rebuttal
In their article, Chakraborty and Kidd specifically refute the conclusions
of Lewontin and Hartl.74 Although they admit substructuring may exist
within the general population, Chakraborty and Kidd concluded that the
effect of any subpopulation has a negligible effect on DNA typing probabilities.7' No matter what the mating habits of a particular group are, each
group generally shares the same genetic patterns of the larger population
because of the "gene exchange" that has occurred since the beginning of
evolution.76 Specifically, the Chakraborty and Kidd article urges the reader
"not to be misled regarding nonrandom mating and the genetic consequences
of the substructure in human populations. "I
As a basis for their attack, Chakraborty and Kidd challenge the
"demographic studies" which were used by Lewontin and Hartl to support
their claim that genetic variation stays within the individual subgroups.7 8
Chakraborty and Kidd argue that "population genetic theory shows that even
a small amount of gene migration across ethnic and religious boundaries will
quickly homogenize populations." 79 When Lewontin's theory is applied to
subgroups, Chakraborty and Kidd find that most genetic differences are still
found between individuals within the subgroups rather than between the

71. Id.
72. Id. at 1749; The fear is that courtroom prejudice might occur where a VNTR

combination that is very rare in the reference population may in actuality be very common

within the suspect's particular subgroup which increases the chance of him or her being
incorrectly identified as the criminal. Roberts, supra note 66, at 1723.
73. Lewontin & Hart, supra note 58, at 1749-50. The authors did acknowledge that DNA
typing was probably one of the most powerful innovations in forensic science since the
development of fingerprinting. Id. at 1746.
74. Chakraborty & Kidd, supra note 43, at 1736-39.
75. Id. at 1738.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1737.
78. Id.; see Lewontin & Hart, supra note 58, at 1747.
79. Chakraborty & Kidd, supra note 43, at 1737. Small gene migration, such as marriages
outside a 10 mile radius or marriages of mixed ethnicity, are enough to cause substantial
homogenization within only two or three generations. Id.
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Accordingly, this demonstrates the biological
subgroups themselves.'
diversity of individuals, even "in extremely subdivided groups."',
Furthermore, Chakraborty and Kidd state that even if such genetic
differences do exist and do affect the statistical estimates, the current testing
procedures are conservative enough to compensate for their effect on the
Their article notes that an technique known as
multiplication rule.'
"binning" obtains valid but conservative estimates for DNA profile probabilities. 3 Essentially, the binning method (which is used by the FBI) takes
alleles that are of similar size, but are too difficult to distinguish from one
another, and pools them into the same bin.' This creates a standard basepair length which factors out any measurement error. 85 The total allele
frequencies within the bin appear in a data base composed of persons of a
given race. 6 As a result, population substructure is not needed in the
frequency calculations because the "binned allele frequencies" are basically
unbiased estimates of the averages of any underlying subgroups within the
general population. 7
C. The NRC Response
After a two year study, the NRC released its report, DNA Technology
in ForensicScience."8 Published four months after the Science articles, the
NRC report specifically considered the population substructuring theory. 9
The committee spent months analyzing this subject and found considerable
debate among population geneticists regarding the existence and effect of
substructuring. 90 The report noted that there are some population geneticists that believe "the absence of substructure cannot be assumed, but must
be proved empirically." 91 The report also found that other population

80. Id.

81. Id.
82. Id. at 1735-36.
83. Id. The same procedure is used for blood groups and proteins. Id. at 1735.
84. Id. Bins are a defined range of DNA base pairs lengths which are classed according to
measurement error and size standards. Id. The FBI, for example, determines a match if two
fragments differ in base-pair length by less than 2.5%. People v. Barney, 8 Cal. App. 4th 798,

809 (1992).

85. Chakraborty & Kidd, supra note 43, at 1735.
86. People v. Barney, 8 Cal. App. 4th 798, 809 (1992). Such a data base is created by
obtaining DNA pattern bands for each racial group (i.e., Caucasian, Black, and Hispanic), and
then processing the pattern for each member assigning the bands to appropriate bins and then
calculating the frequency of occurrence within the data base for the bands assigned to a given
bin. Id.
87. Chakraborty & Kidd, supra note 43, at 1736.
88. See DNA Technology, supra note 15.
89. DNA Technology, supra note 15, at 79.
90. See Id. at 79, 91-95; see also Roberts, supra note 66, at 1723.

91. DNA Technology, supra note 15, at 80. Specifically, the report cited Lewontin and
Hartl. See Id.at 95 n.10.
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geneticists, "while recognizing the possibility or likelihood of population
substructure, conclude that the evidence to date suggests that the effect on
estimates of genotype frequencies are minimal. "I
After consideration of numerous scientific data, including both Science
articles, however, the committee could find no evidence based on current
empirical data to support the proposition that subpopulations have any effect
on the calculation of population frequencies. 93 In spite of this conclusion,
the committee chose to "assume for the sake of discussion that population
substructure may exist" and may significantly affect frequency calculations. 4 With this assumption in mind, the report recommended its own
conservative number method for estimating population frequencies.95 The
NRC's method sought a calculation method "so conservative as to ensure that
that the evidence could be said
there would be no serious scientific argument
96
defendant."
a
against
case
the
to overstate
Although the NRC report endorsed the multiplication rule, it modified
the calculations.' To keep estimates conservative-even with substructuring-the allele frequencies used in the calculations must exceed the allele
frequencies in the subpopulations. 98 To accomplish this goal, the report
proposed a "ceiling principle" whereby a ceiling frequency is determined for
each allele at each locus. 9 9 This ceiling represents the upper bound for the
allele frequency independent of the individual's ethnicity. In order to
determine ceiling frequencies the NRC report recommended that 100 persons
from each of 15-20 population subgroups should be sampled for allele
frequency variation.100 The highest allele frequency found in any of the
15-20 subpopulations or 5%, whichever is greater, should be used as the
frequency for that particular allele. 101 The resulting frequencies then may
be multiplied pursuant to the multiplication rule."~ Until such sampling
and estimates are completed, the NRC report recommended temporary adjust-

92. Id. Specifically, the report cited Chakraborty and Kidd. See id. at 96 n. 12.
93. Id.

94. Id.
95. Id. at 82-86.
96. Eric S. Lander, DNA Fingerprinting: The NRC Report (Letter), 260 SCIENCE 1221
(1993). The NRC report stated, "Our recommendations represent an attempt to lay a firm
foundation for DNA typing that will be able to support the increasing weight that will be placed
on such evidence in the coming years." DNA Technology, supra note 15, at 93.
97. DNA Technology, supra note 15, at 82.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 83.
101. Id. Since subpopulation frequencies may "drift" more than the general population, a
conservative allele frequency can be achieved by using a bound of 5% even if the observed
frequency is 1%. Id. at 84.
102. Id. at 82.
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ments of current data to achieve more conservative frequency estimates. 03
III. JUDICIAL REACTION

A. Admissibility Standards
The NRC's report has had a wide impact on the admissibility of DNA
evidence."°4 The admissibility of new or novel scientific techniques, such
as DNA typing, is generally governed in most jurisdictions by one of two
standards. 5 Courts have used either the "Frye standard" or the "relevancy standard" when deciding whether novel scientific evidence will be admit-

ted. 106
1. The Fye-Test
The majority of state and federal courts have used the standard set forth
' as the basis for the
in Frye v. United States""
admission of scientific
0
evidence.'1 Under the Frye-test, the scientific technique employed must
be "sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the
particular field in which it belongs." 9 Since judges are not qualified to
decide who is right in a scientific debate, Frye merely requires them to
decide whether a legitimate debate exists in the scientific community."0

103. Id. at 91. This temporary method requires testing laboratories to determine if a sample
matches any previously tested DNA type in the lab's databank. Id. If no match occurs, then
the lab should report the size of the database in order to illustrate to jurors its rarity in the
population. Id. at 92. In addition, the laboratory should determine an "interim ceiling"
frequency by modifying the ceiling principle with a higher bound of 10% instead of 5 % for each
allele frequency (provided that population studies have been completed on at least three major
races.) Id. The 10% higher boundary merely reflects the uncertainty surrounding the effect of
substructuring on frequency estimates. Id.
104. Sherman, supra note 6, at 30.
105. John T. Sylvester & John H. Stafford, JudicialAcceptanceof DNA Profiling, FBI Law
Enforcement Bulletin, July 1991, at 26, 26.
106. Id.
107. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923)

108. Stolorow & Clarke, supra note 7, at 18.
109. Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
110. The technique or procedure used in a given case is usually not at issue under the Frye-

test since such questioning is reserved for the jury which may weigh the evidence according to
how correctly the testing procedures were applied. Sylvester & Stafford, supra note 105, at 2627.
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2. The Relevancy Standard

As an alternative to the Frye-test, federal courts and several state courts
have turned to the relevancy standard."1 Under the relevancy standard,
which is based on the Federal Rules of Evidence," 2 the court must consider whether the relevance, the probativeness, the materiality, and reliability
of the proffered evidence outweigh its potential to either mislead the jury or
unfairly prejudice the defendant." 3

Whether the technique is "generally

accepted" in the scientific community is merely a factor in determining its
admissibility. "4
3. The Reliability Requirement
Both standards have been expanded in some states and in federal courts

with an additional "reliability" requirement." 5 The reliability requirement
asks whether the correct scientific techniques have been applied in the testing
process." 6 On the state court level, one of the first DNA cases to use this7
new requirement in conjunction with the Frye-test was People v. Castro."
The Castro court felt that DNA evidence presented special problems of
reliability which required adding another layer to the already conservative
Frye-test." 8

The Castro court enunciated a three prong test for the

admissibility of DNA evidence." 9 The first two prongs of the test were

111. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993); see also
State v. Pierce, 597 N.E.2d 107 (Ohio 1992); Kelly v. State, 824 S.W.2d 568 (Tex. Crim. App.
1992).
112. See Fed. R. Evid. 401-403, 702-704.
113. Stephanie B. Goldberg, A New Day for DNA?, ABA JOURNAL, Apr. 1992, at 84, 84.
See United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117
(1979). States that have adopted the relevancy standard include Arkansas, Delaware, Florida,
Georgia, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Montana, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, South Carolina,
Texas, and Virginia. Clarke, supra note 9, at 8.
114. Sylvester & Stafford, supra note 105, at 27.
115. Goldberg, supra note 113, at 84; see, e.g., People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985
(N.Y.S. 1989); United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786, 796 (2d Cir. 1992); see also infra text
accompanying notes 151-156.
116. Goldberg, supra note 113, at 84; see, e.g., People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 986
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989); State v. Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d 422, 426 (Minn. 1989); Caldwell v.
State, 393 S.E.2d 436, 441-42 (Ga. 1990); United States v. Two Bulls, 918 F.2d 56, 60-61 (8th
Cir. 1990), reh'g granted, vacated en banc, 925 F.2d 1127 (8th Cir. 1991); Jakobetz, 955 F.2d
at 796; see also People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240 (Cal. 1976).
117. 545 N.Y.S.2d 985 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989).
118. Id. at 987. The court was of the view that by focusing attention on the general
acceptance issue, the Frye-test overlooked significant problems in the use of a particular
technique. Id. Because DNA typing is so complex, the court felt that even if it passed the Fryetest, it was still insufficient to present it to a jury without a preliminary hearing regarding the
procedures used. Id.
119. Id.
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from Frye,"2° but the third prong was concerned with whether the testing
laboratory had performed the accepted scientific techniques in analyzing the
forensic samples in the particular case.12 1 Applying the three prong test,
the Castro court had no problem finding general acceptance of DNA
evidence under the first two prongs.'2 It was at the third inquiry, however, that the court held the DNA evidence inadmissible because the private
laboratory had not applied the generally accepted technique for DNA
typing.12
On the federal level, the Eighth Circuit followed the Castrodecision and
added the reliability requirement to the Frye-test in United States v. Two
Bulls. 4 The court justified the addition to the Frye-test because of the
novelty of DNA evidence and the prejudice to the defendant.125 The Two
Bulls court found the added requirement to be "a sufficient foundational basis
as to the overall admissibility of the evidence."'2
The more liberal relevancy standard was also subjected to the reliability
requirement in United States v. Jakobetz. 7 Citing both Two Bulls and
Castro, the Second Circuit did not find the challenges of DNA evidence so
special "as to require a new standard of admissibility."" 2 Although the
trial court should inquire as to whether the proper scientific techniques were
properly performed, the Jakobetz court, in contrast to Castro, concluded that
this issue should go to the weight rather than the admissibility of the
evidence. 12 9 Adopting a standard of relevance and reliability, the circuit
court held that despite the complex, confusing, and novel evidence, "the jury
must retain its fact-finding function." 3 '

120. Prong one asks if there is a theory which is generally accepted in the scientific
community which supports the conclusion that DNA forensic testing can produce reliable results.
Id. Prong two asks whether the techniques that currently exist are capable of producing reliable
results. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 988-90.

123. Id. at 995-99. Ironically, after the judge's exclusion of the DNA evidence, the

defendant decided to plead guilty and he subsequently admitted that the blood found on his watch
from which the DNA was taken was that of the victim. Stolorow & Clarke, supra, note 7, at
18-19. Other states courts have followed the Castro precedent and applied a similar "reliability"
requirement. See State v. Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d 422 (Minn. 1989); Caldwell v. State, 393
S.E.2d 436 (Ga. 1990).

124. 918 F.2d 56 (8th Cir. 1990).
125. Id. at 60.
126. Id. Although the appeal was dismissed when the appellant died, the Two Bulls court
ultimately adopted the three part test laid in Castro. Id. at 61.
127. 955 F.2d 786 (2d Cir. 1992).
128. Id. at 796.

129. Id. at 800.
130. Id. at 796. For the standards implicit in the relevancy test adopted in Jacobetz see
United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1198 (2d Cir. 1978).
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4. Daubert v. MerrellDow Pharmaceuticals,Inc.
Recently, on June 28, 1993, the United States Supreme Court in Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc.' held that the Frye standard of
admissibility does not govern trials conducted in federal courts.1 12 Instead,
Frye's "general acceptance" test was superseded by the Federal Rules of
Evidence and, in particular, by the more liberal admissibility standard of
Federal Rule of Evidence 702, which permits the admission of expert
testimony pertaining to "scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge[.]" 133 The "general acceptance" standard, wrote Justice Blackmun
134
for the court, would be contrary to the "liberal thrust" of the rules.
Rule 702's requirement, stated Blackmun, that an expert's testimony pertain

to "scientific knowledge" establishes a standard of evidentiary reliability. 35
In addition, the Court found that Rule 702's requirement that expert

testimony "assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine

3 6 In order to
a fact in issue" addresses the relevancy of such evidence.Y

satisfy this condition, the proponent of the testimony must demonstrate that
the evidence supports "a valid scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry.,,137 The Court also noted that "[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are

and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible
the traditional
138
evidence."

Daubert'seffect on the admissibility of DNA evidence was examined by
the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Martinez.139 The Eighth Circuit
noted that the Second Circuit in Jakobetz employed a reliability approach

under Rule 702 similar to that used in Daubert.14° The court in Martinez

concluded that the Second Circuit's determinations as to the general theory
131. 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993).
132. Id. at 480.

133. Id. (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 702).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 480-81. In order to assess the reliability of novel scientific evidence under Rule
702, the Court instructed courts to look at (1) whether the scientific knowledge being presented
has been tested or whether its underlying theory can be falsified; (2) whether it has been subject
to peer review and publication; (3) what the technique's known rate of error is; and (4) whether
the technique is generally accepted in the relevant community. Id. at 482-83.
136.Id. at 481 (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 702). According to Daubert, before scientific expert
testimony can be admitted, the trial court must conclude, under Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a)
that the proposed testimony constitutes (1) scientific knowledge that (2) will assist the jury to
understand or determine a fact in issue. Id. at 482. The subject of the testimony does not have
to be a known certainty, but "in order to qualify as 'scientific knowledge,' an inference or
assertion must be derived by the scientific method." Id. at 481.
137. Id. at 482.
138. Id. at 484. Recommending that courts respect the differing functions ofjudge and jury,

the Court also noted that the focus of the inquiry "must be solely upon the principles and
methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate." Id.
139. 3 F.3d 1191 (8th Cir. 1993).
140. Id. at 1197.
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4' The Eighth
and techniques of DNA evidence were valid under Daubert.1
Circuit then inquired into whether the Supreme Court created a reliability
requirement in its Daubert opinion.'42 The Martinez court found that the
reliability inquiry 4 3 set forth in Daubert mandates a preliminary hearing44
to determine if the expert properly performed the scientific procedure.
The court determined that such a hearing suggests that the inquiry goes
beyond merely the reliability of the abstract principles or methodologies. 45
According to Martinez, Daubert requires the trial court to determine if the
expert applied a reliable technique in the particular case.' 46 The Eighth

Circuit emphasized, however, that this inquiry was "a flexible one ...

[and]

not every error in the application of a particular methodology should warrant
exclusion." Apparently inferring that this reliability requirement goes more
to the weight of the evidence than to its admissibility, the circuit court stated
that any alleged deficiencies in the techniques used provide a basis for
exclusion of the evidence only if "'a reliable methodology was so altered ...

as to skew the methodology itself.

. .'"

With this adoption of the relevancy standard, DNA evidence will likely
have less trouble with admissibility in federal courts. The Frye test, which
has been used in both federal and state courts, has represented a major
obstacle for the admission of DNA population frequency data.'" It
remains to be seen whether state courts will adopt the Daubert relevancy
standard over a Frye related standard. Although Daubert does not necessarily apply to state courts, its persuasive force is strengthened in that many
states have modeled their rules of evidence after the federal rules. 4 9

141. Id.
142. Id. The court noted both the Castro and the Jakobetz reliability requirement and that
Castro's requirement went to the admissibility of the evidence whereas Jakobetz's reliability
requirement went to the weight of the evidence. Id.
143. See supra note 144.

144. Id, at 1197-98.
145. Id. at 1198.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. For a criticism of the Frye-test see Jason D. Altman, Comment, Admissibility of
ForensicDNA Profiling Evidence: A Movement Away From Frye v. United States and a Step
Toward the FederalRules ofEvidence: United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786 (2d Cir. 1992),
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 104 (1992), 44 WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 211, n.27 (1993).
149. A few state courts have specifically commented on the Daubert rationale. In August
1993, the Arizona Supreme Court considered the Daubert standard, but declined to use it and
opted for the Frye-test instead. State v. Bible, 858 P.2d 1152, 1183 (Ariz. 1993) ("We leave
Daubert for another day and, in accordance with Arizona precedent-old and new-apply
Frye[.]");see Springfield v. State, 1993 WL 362357 *9 (Wyo.) (adopting the Daubertrationale
as similar to its relevancy standard); see also Nelson v. State, 628 A.2d 69, 74 n.7 (Del. 1993)
(state's relevancy standard modeled after the Federal Rules).
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B. JudicialAcceptance
1. DNA Theory & Technology
The underlying principles and theory behind DNA technology have been
generally accepted for several years within both the scientific community and
the judicial system."' Attacks on the testing process, such as subjective
interpretation of band matches or the absence of standardization and proper
proficiency testing have frequently been used to show a lack of general
acceptance. 5 1 Yet, such claims, analyzed under either the Frye-test or a
relevancy related test, have been rejected in twenty-nine states and one
In addition, the Office of Technology Assessment
federal circuit court.'
of the United States Congress ("OTA") and the NRC have both endorsed the
reliability of RFLP typing. Over three years ago the OTA stated that
"forensic uses of DNA tests are both reliable and valid when properly performed and analyzed by skilled personnel." "' The OTA went on to report
that questions about DNA technology or its theory are "red herrings that do
the courts and the public a disservice."' 54 In April of 1992, the NRC
released its report, DNA Technology in Forensic Science, which endorsed
forensic uses of DNA typing technologies, specifically RFLP analysis."5
2. DNA Population Frequency Data
While the prevalent case law and the recommendations from both the
OTA and the NRC support the general acceptance of DNA technology, the
NRC report's discussion of substructuring has had a confusing effect on the

150. Genetic Witness, supra note 20, at 7-8; DNA Technology, supra note 15, at 144-145,
149; People v. Axell, 235 Cal. App. 3d 836, 856 ("DNA fingerprinting involve[s] scientific
principles and technology all of which have gained general acceptance in the scientific field in
which they belong."). Extensive case law in several other states also supports the admission of
DNA evidence. See e.g., Snowden v. State, 574 So. 2d 960 (Ala. App. 1990); Swanson v.
State, 823 S.W.2d 812 (Ark. 1992); Toranzo v. State, 608 So. 2d 83 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1992), review dismissed, State v. Toranzo, 613 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1993); Caldwell v. State, 393
S.E.2d 436 (Ga. 1990); State v. Montalbo, 828 P.2d 1274 (Haw. 1992); People v. Miles, 577
N.E.2d 477 (Ill. 1991); Woodcox v. State, 591 N.E.2d 1019 (Ind. 1992); State v. Brown, 470
N.W.2d 30 (Iowa 1991); Smith v. Deppish, 807 P.2d 144 (Kan. 1991); People v. Wesley, 589
N.Y.S.2d 197 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992); State v. Pierce, 597 N.E.2d 107 (Ohio 1992); Kelly v.
State, 824 S.W.2d 568 (Tex. 1992); State v. Ford, 392 S.E.2d 781 (S.C. 1990); Rivera v. State,
840 P.2d 933 (Wyo. 1992); Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786.
151. Interview with George W. Clarke, Deputy District Attorney, Assistant Chief, Training
Division, Office of the District Attorney, San Diego County, California, in San Diego, Cal.
(June 15, 1993).

152. See supra note 149.
153. Genetic Witness, supra note 19, at 7-8.

154. Id. at 8.
155. DNA Technology, supra note 15, at 144-145.
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courts. 56 Specifically, whether the methods for calculating DNA popula-

Before the
tion frequency data are reliable continues to be debated."
release of the NRC report the admissibility of population statistics was widely
supported."' Prior to 1991, only a handful of cases excluded DNA evidence
because the statistics were challenged. 59 However, with the release of the
Science articles in 1991 and the NRC report in 1992, more and more courts
began to question the admissibility of DNA population frequency data.'"
1. Federal Courts

On the federal district court level, only two cases were heard prior to the
NRC report.' 6 ' Although one case used a relevancy standard and the other
case used a Frye related standard for admissibility, both cases admitted the
DNA population frequency data. In the first federal opinion attacking the
use of population frequency data, the court in United States v. Jakobetz

admitted the DNA evidence under the relevancy standard. 62 Upholding
the reliability of the FBI's techniques, the court concluded that the lower
court's findings "would satisfy not only the Frye standard, but the Two Bulls
and Castro standard as well."' 163

The second federal court to consider

DNA admissibility was heard by the magistrate in United States v. Yee.164
Under the requirements of the Frye-test, the magistrate recommended that the
FBI's DNA evidence be admitted."as Affirming his recommendation, the

156. See, e.g., B.S. Weir, DNA FingerprintingReport (Letter), 260 SCIENCE 473 (1993)
(citing State v. Uuevara, No. K9-92-1873 (D.Minn.Jan. 26, 1993)).
157. See Atoigue, 1992 WL 245628, at *4; Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 596 N.E.2d 311,
316 (Mass. 1992); State v. Vandebogart, 616 A.2d 483, 493-94 (N.H. 1992); State v. Cauthron
846 P.2d 502, 514-517 (Wash. 1993); State v. Bible, 858 P.2d 1152, 1188-89 (Ariz. 1993).
158. See e.g., Snowden v. State, 574 So. 2d 960 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990); Andrews v.
State, 533 So. 2d 841 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988); Martinez v. State, 549 So. 2d 694 (Fla.Dist.
App. 1991); People v. Miles, 577
Ct. App. 1989); People v. Lipscomb, 574 N.E.2d 1345 (Ill.
App. 1991); Hopkins v. State, 579 N.E.2d 1297 (Ind. 1991); Davidson v.
N.E.2d 477 (I11.
State, 580 N.E.2d 238 (Ind. 1991); State v. Brown, 470 N.W.2d 30 (Iowa 1991); Smith v.
Deppish, 807 P.2d 144 (Kan. 1991); State v. Davis, 814 S.W.2d 593 (Mo. 1991); State v.
Pennington, 393 S.E.2d 847 (N.C. 1990); State v. Ford, 392 S.E.2d 781 (S.C. 1990); Glover
v. State, 787 S.W.2d 544 (rex. App. 1990); Kelly v. State, 824 S.W.2d 568 (rex. Crim. App.
1990); Mandujano v. State, 799 S.W.2d 318 (Tex. App. 1990); Bethune v. State, 821 S.W.2d
222 (rex. Ct. App. 1991); Trimboli v. State, 817 S.W.2d 785 (Tex. App. 1991); Spencer v.
Commonwealth, 385 S.E.2d 850 (Va. 1989); Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786 (8th Cir. 1992).
159. Thompson & Ford, supra note 5, at 58.
160. See, e.g., Caldwell v. State, 393 S.E.2d 436, 443 (Ga. 1990); People v. Mohit, 579
N.Y.S.2d 990, 998 (N.Y.S. 1992); State v. Houser, 490 N.W.2d 168, 183-84 (Neb. 1992).
161. See Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786; United States v. Yee, 134 F.R.D. 161 (N.D. Ohio 1991);
but see United States v. Two Bulls, 918 F.2d 56, 61 (8th Cir. 1990) (although the decision was
later vacated, the Two Bulls court rejected the DNA evidence under the Castro rational).
162. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d at 796-97, 800. Jakobetz was also the first federal appellate court
to consider the admissibility of DNA evidence.
163. Id. at 799.
164. 134 F.R.D. 161.
165. Id. at 202.
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Yee court held that general acceptance existed for the FBI's data frequency
calculations."

Only one federal case regarding DNA admissibility has been published
since the release of the NRC report. 67 In September 1993, the Eighth
Circuit in United States v. Martinez,'68 decided whether DNA profiling
evidence was admissible under the relevancy approached adopted in

Daubert.69 The appellate court found, under Daubert's reliability require-

ment, that the techniques employed in the particular case to be reliable and
admitted the evidence of a DNA "match."17 The Martinez court was not

provided with the opportunity, however, to decide upon the admissibility of
DNA population frequency data since the trial171 court had excluded the
statistical data in response to appellant's request.
2. State Courts

a. Relevancy Jurisdictions. The impact of the NRC report on states
employing a relevancy standard for admitting scientific evidence has been
marginal compared to jurisdictions using a Frye related test. For example,
in Ohio prior to the NRC report, the court in State v. Blair" found DNA

statistical evidence admissible." 7 Five months after the NRC report, the
Ohio Supreme Court in State v. Pierce" found, under the relevancy and

reliability test used in Jakobetz, that the population frequency data was again
admissible and that questions of reliability go to the weight of the evidence.17 The court acknowledged the subpopulation debate in both the
Science articles and the NRC report and concluded that "'[t]he court must
allow the jury to discharge its duties of weighing the evidence, making

166. Id. at 166.
167. See e.g., United States v. Martinez, 3 F.3d 1191 (8th Cir. 1993). Martinez was also
only the second federal appellate court to consider DNA admissibility. Note, however, that two
weeks after Martinez was decided, the Fourth Circuit in Spencer v. Murray, denied petitioner's
federal habeas corpus claim and affirmed the state court's finding that DNA evidence was
admissible. Spencer v. Murray, No. 92-4006, 1993 WL 355844, *4 (4th Cir. Va. Sept. 16,
1993).
168. 3 F.3d 1191.
169. Although the trial court in Martinez applied the three prong test announced in People
v. Castro, the appellate court found Castro's test to be "at least as stringent as the test mandated
in Daubert." Id. at 1198.
170. Id. at 1197.
171. Id. at 1199. Appellant had made the suggestion that the district court exclude the
statistical data. Yet, on appeal, appellant claimed that the exclusion of the statistical data
prejudiced him because the jury would conclude that he was the only possible source of the
DNA. Id. The court concluded that appellant was barred from raising this argument, however,
under the doctrine of invited error. Id.
172. 592 N.E.2d 854 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993).
173. Id. at 866-67.
174. 597 N.E.2d 107 (Ohio 1992).
175. Id. at 115.
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credibility determinations, and ultimately deciding the facts."'1 76 The jury
was thus free to reject the DNA evidence if it believed it to be false or
misleading."7 In a pre-NRC report decision, the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals in Kelly v. State17 ' held DNA population frequency data admissible
under a relevancy and reliability standard.179 The Kelly court's holding has
remained intact despite several challenges to DNA evidence in 1992.181
Florida has been similarly supportive of DNA statistical evidence under the
relevancy test both before and after the NRC report.' 8 ' In a ost-NRC
report case, the Florida Court of Appeals in Toranzo v. State' had no
problem following pre-NRC case law admitting DNA population frequency
data. I
In Wyoming, the supreme court in Springfield v. State' stated that the
Daubertrelevancy standard was paralleled under their state's version of the
relevancy test."" The court noted the problems Frye jurisdictions had with
the NRC report and the debate over population subgroups.1 6 Yet, the
Springfield court did not concern itself with the acceptability of the NRC's
approach since, in its view, population substructure affected the weight of the
evidence, and in addition, the jury was free to disregard or disbelieve the
expert testimony.'17 The court therefore admitted the DNA statistical data
since it would assist the jury and because the conservative statistical
calculations of the NRC report had been used.
b. Frye Jurisdictions. States employing a Frye related test have had
more difficulty with the admission of DNA statistical data. Prior to the NRC
report in a non-DNA case, the Massachusetts court in Commonwealth v.

176. Id. (quoting United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786, 796-97 (2d Cir. 1992).
177. Id.
178. 824 S.W.2d 568 (rex. Crim. App. 1992).
179. Id. at 573-74.
180. See Glover v. State 825 S.W.2d 127, 128 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992); Trimboli v. State,
826 S.W.2d 953, 954 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992); Fuller v. State, 827 S.W.2d 919, 930 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1992); Bethune v. State, 821 S.W.2d 222, 225 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992); Barnes v.
State, 839 S.W.2d 118, 124 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992).
181. See Robinson v. State, 610 So. 2d 1288, 1291 (Fla. 1992); Martinez v. State, 549 So.
2d 694, 697 (Fla. 1989); Andrews v. State, 533 So. 2d 841, 849-51 (Fla. 1988).
182. 608 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 1992).
183. Id. at 84.
184. No. 92-162, 1993 WL 362357 (Wyo. Sept. 21, 1993).
185. Id. at *9.
186. Id. at *15.
187. Id. at *14-*15,
188. Id. at *15. In another example, the Delaware Supreme Court in Nelson v. State
employed a relevancy standard almost identical to that used in Daubert. However, while the
Nelson court deferred on deciding the admissibility of DNA statistical data, it nevertheless
rejected the prosecution's claim that statistics go to the weight of the evidence, not the admissibility of the DNA matching evidence. Nelson v. State, 628 A.2d 69, 74 n.7, 76 n.9 (Del.
1993).
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Gomes 89 admitted under a Frye related test statistical data obtained
pursuant to the multiplication rule."9 In another pre-NRC case, the
Massachusetts court in Commonwealth v. Cumin'91 used Frye again, this
time to determine the admissibility of DNA evidence."9 Although the
court found general acceptance for the theory underlying DNA technology,
the court could not find general acceptance for statistical methods employed
therein."9 The court noted that questions about subpopulations created
uncertainty in the scientific community regarding the use of the multiplication
rule. 94 Finding a lack of general acceptance for the population statistics,
the court held the DNA evidence inadmissible. 195
Following the release of the NRC report, in Commonwealth v.
Lanigan,196 the Massachusetts court again considered the admissibility of
DNA evidence. The court noted that although the magistrate in United States
v. Yee had admitted population frequency data, the debate over population
substructure had increased since then with the release of the NRC report and
its specific concern over subpopulations.' 9 Finding a "lively, and still
very current, dispute" in the scientific community regarding the existence of
"population substructuring" possibly affecting the reliability of frequency
estimates, the court affirmed the trial court's order denying DNA evidence."9 '
In another one of the few cases to challenge DNA frequency data before
the release of the Science articles and the NRC Report, the Minnesota court
in State v. Schwartz, rejected the use of population frequency data for DNA
evidence under the Minnesota version of Frye."9 However, the court
refused the statistical evidence not because of a lack of general acceptance in
the scientific community, but because case law in existence prior to DNA
analysis had traditionally rejected population frequency data in conventional,

189. 526 N.E.2d 1270 (Mass. 1988) (using probability data for genetic markers found in a
bloodstain).
190. Id. at 1276-77, 1279-80.
191. 565 N.E.2d 440 (Mass. 1991).
192. Id. at 443.
193. Id. at 441-42. Since Frye itself was not satisfied, the court did not inquire into whether
the procedures were applied properly. Id. at 442.
194. Id. at 443-44.
195. Id. at 445. "We need not resolve the propriety of the forensic DNA testing conducted
in this case because we conclude that there is no demonstrated general acceptance or inherent

rationality of the process by which Cellmark arrived at its conclusion that one Caucasian in
59,000,000 would have the DNA components disclosed by the test that showed an identity
between the defendant's DNA and that found on the nightgown." Id. at 442.
196. 596 N.E.2d 311 (Mass. 1992).
197. Id. at 315-16.
198. Id. at 316.
199. State v. Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d 422, 424, 428-29 (Minn. 1989).
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non-DNA serology. 0 Finding the probability data "integral to DNA
typing," the court refused to admit the evidence altogether."0 In case
decided two months after the NRC report's release, the Minnesota court in
State v. Jobe' held that the FBI protocol established an appropriate set of
standards and guidelines for admitting DNA evidence.'
Although the
court did not address the issue of population statistics since it was not raised
on appeal, the supreme court reviewed the entire NRC report and found
nothing in it inconsistent with the court's holding.'
The court further
concluded that the basic DNA testing procedures went to the weight of the
evidence, but whether the procedures were actually complied with were
subject to admissibility under the state's version of Frye.'
In May 1992, the Minnesota district court in State v. Alt 6 ackmowledged the release of the NRC report and its concern over population
substructure, and subsequently issued an order limiting the use of DNA test
results.'
In light of the debate over population subgroups, the district
court held that the FBI statistical calculations were not generally accepted
under Frye and therefore could not admitted." 8 Upon review, however,
the appellate court reversed the district court's decision even though the
appellate court found the scientific debate to affect the application of the
multiplication rule.'
The appellate court concluded that the NRC's
adoption of the modified ceiling principle created general acceptance within
200. Id. at 428-29. Minnesota, in a unique trilogy of case law, has limited admission of
population frequency data to the frequencies of individual loci and prohibited the use of the
multiplication rule (i.e., the multiplying of the individual locus frequencies). See State v. loon
Kyu Kim, 398 N.W.2d 544, 547 (Minn. 1987) (limiting the use of population frequency data
for fear the jury would interpret such statistical evidence as a measure of the defendant's guilt);
State v. Jobe, 486 N.W.2d 407 (Minn. 1992); State v. Johnson, 498 N.W.2d 10 (Minn. 1993).
See also State v. Alt, 504 N.W.2d 38, 42 n.6 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) ("locus frequencies...
are the strongest probability evidence admissible under Joon Kyu Kim and Johnson.").
201. Id. at 428. Curiously, the Minnesota court expressly withheld comment on a newly
enacted state statute which provided admissibility for population data frequencies and subsequent
DNA test results. Id. at 429 n.6. See Minn. Stat. § 634.25-26, (Supp. 1989). Note, however,
that the Minnesota Supreme Court has recently questioned the validity of this statute. State v.
Alt, 504 N.W.2d 38, 41 n.2 (Minn.1993) (citing State v. Nielsen, 467 N.W.2d 615, 620 (Minn.

1991)).
202. 486 N.W.2d 407 (Minn. 1992).

203. Id. at 419-20.
204. Id. at 420 n.4.
205. Id. at 420.
206. 504 N.W.2d 38 (Minn.Ct. App. 1993).

207. Id. at 41.
208. Id. at 41. In June 1992, the prosecution filed a motion to reconsider claiming the FBI
calculations were consistent with the NRC report. Id. In August 1992, the prosecution again
offered the population frequency data consistent with the state's case law regarding the
presentation of statistical evidence. Id. at 41-42. The district court, however, in December
1992, denied all motions relating to the admission of DNA evidence and confirmed its May 1992

order. Id. at 42.

209. Id. at 49-51. Although the product of the multiplication rule is not disclosed to the jury
in Minnesota, the court found the scientific debate to affect even the probability calculations on

individual loci. Id. at 49-50.
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the scientific community. 10° It therefore allowed the statistical evidence to
be admitted
if calculated according to the NRC's approach and remanded the
211
case.

In contrast to Minnesota, the Arizona Supreme Court in August 1993,
refused to admit DNA population statistics altogether.212 In State v. Bible,
the supreme court applied basically a straight forward Frye test "subject to
a foundational showing. '213 Noting the significant controversy over the
last two years concerning population subgroups, including the science articles
as well as case law in other states, the court found the probability calculations to be flawed and not generally accepted within the scientific community. 214 In another Frye jurisdiction, the Colorado court in Fishback v.
People2i 5 found that the trial court in October 1989, had properly concluded that population frequency calculations were generally accepted at the
time. 21 6 However, the reviewing court conceded "that considerable debate
has emerged in the three years since the trial in this case concerning the
acceptability of the statistical frequencies ... "217 The court then left the
question open as to whether or not the method for calculating the frequency
data was generally accepted in light of the new events.2 s
3. California Case Law
a. Interpretation of Kelly-Frye. Perhaps the best example of the impact
219
of the Science articles and the NRC report is demonstrated in California.
In California, the admissibility standards for scientific evidence are controlled
by a modified Frye test. In People v. Kelly,' the California Supreme
Court required that "correct scientific procedures" be shown to have been

210. Id. at 51. Similarly see Vandebogart, 616 A.2d at 493-95 (reversing trial court's
decision to admit DNA statistical data, yet citing and giving praise to the NRC's approach).
211. Id. at 51, 53. In accordance with the state's case law, the statistical evidence was
limited to frequencies of individual loci. Id.
212. See State v. Bible, 858 P.2d 1152, 1190 (Ariz. 1993).
213. Id. at 1183 (citing State ex rel. Collins v. Superior Court, 644 P.2d 1266, 1282 (Ariz.
1982). This foundational showing relates the expert's qualifications, proper application of
testing techniques, and accurate recording of test results. Id. at 1184.
214. Id. at 1188-89. The court found the calculations to be flawed for three reasons: "(1)
they are impermissibly based on the disputed assumptions of linkage equilibrium; (2) the
database relied on is of disputed statistical validity; and (3) the database relied on is not in
Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium." Id.
215. 851 P.2d 884 (Colo. 1993).
216. Id. at 894.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 895.
219. State v. Bible, 858 P.2d 1152, 1188 ("impact of articles is best demonstrated by
California cases").
220. 549 P.2d 1240 (Cal. 1976).
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used in testing in addition to Frye's requirements.2 2 Recent California
Supreme Court decisions have interpreted this additional third prong of the
"Kelly-Frye" rule to test the scientific technique and not the competency with
which it is applied, i.e., "correct" procedures, not procedures applied
"correctly. "I Accordingly, deficiencies in testing affect only the weight
of the evidence, not its admissibility.'
The California Supreme Court in
People v. Cooper, 4 supported this interpretation of the Kelly-Frye rule and
reaffirmed the fact that the manner in which testing is conducted does not
bear on admissibility.' 5
b. Application of Kelly-Frye to DNA Evidence. In spite of the state
Supreme Court's guidance, some disagreement still exists as to whether the
Kelly requirement mandates that "correct" procedures be utilized or that such
procedures merely be used "correctly."

In the state's first case on DNA

identification evidence, the court of appeals in People v. Axell" questioned
the scope of the third prong of Kelly-Frye with respect to DNA evidence.'
The court determined that the supreme court had not intended to overrule the
"third prong" of Kelly and that the trial court had erred in not subjecting the
'procedures used' to the Kelly-Frye test."
The Axell court, however,

221. Id. at 1244. In addition to Frye's "general acceptance," Kelly requires the proponent
to satisfy a second and third inquiry: the reliability of the scientific method-usually through
the opinion testimony of a qualified expert on the subject and that correct scientific procedures
were used in the particular case. Id.
222. See e.g., People v. Farmer, 765 P.2d 940, 965 (Cal. 1989) ("Careless testing affects
the weight of the evidence and not its admissibility, and must be attacked on cross-examination
or by other expert testimony."); see id. (citing People v. Coleman, 46 Cal.3d 749, 775 (1988)
("[T]he Kelly-Frye rule tests the fundamental validity of a new scientific methodology, not the
degree of professionalism with which it is applied.")). One California appellate court has also
supported this interpretation. See People v. Smith, 215 Cal. App. 3d 19, 28 (1989) (finding
appellant's argument-alleging careless testing procedures-to be in error).
223. Farmer, 765 P.2d at 965.
224. 809 P.2d 865 (Cal. 1991).
225. Id. at 814. In Cooper, the court rejected the defendant's challenge that a blood and
saliva protein analysis was inadmissible due to an alleged defect in the testing process-and held
that the Farmer-Smith interpretation of Kelly-Frye was correct. Id. Furthermore, the Supreme
Court in People v. Shirley determined that any hearing conducted pursuant to the Frye rule is
not to determine whether or not a technique is in fact reliable. People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d
18, 55 (1982). Rather, the inquiry is merely to determine whether or not that method is
"generally accepted" as reliable by the scientific community. Id.
226. 235 Cal. App. 3d 836 (1991).
227. Id. at 862.
228. Id. The appellate court also cited the district court's opinion in U.S. v. Jakobetz for
similar reasoning. Id. The reference to the federal district court is interesting. In the district
court's decision, the court found that flaws that may exist in the application of DNA profiling
in the particular case are issues of admissibility rather than issues of weight for the jury to
decide. United States v. Jakobetz, 747 F. Supp. 250, 257 n.16 (D. Vt. 1990). However, upon
review (and after the Axell case), the federal appellate court stated, "The district court should
focus on whether accepted protocol was adequately followed in a specific case, but the court,
in exercising its discretion, should be mindful that this issue should go more to the weight than
to the admissibility of the evidence." Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786, 800. (2d Cir. 1992). See People
v. Barney, 8 Cal. App. 4th 798, 823-25 (1992).
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demonstrated its confusion as to "correct" versus "correctly" by citing

People v. Kaurish'9 to allege that the California Supreme Court, before its
Cooper decision, applied Kelly-Frye to procedures used "correctly."" 0 In
Kaurish, the court was concerned with the reliability of the electrophoresis
test;23 1 it was not concerned with whether it was used "correctly" as the

Axell court had inferred. 2

Moreover, the supreme court in Cooper, as

noted above, specifically dismissed any argument that errors in the testing

process were subject to Kelly-Frye.'- As such, it appears that until the
California Supreme Court grants review on a DNA case, the California Court

of Appeals will remain at odds with the California Supreme Court's
interpretation of the third prong of the Kelly-Frye test in regards to DNA
evidence.?

c. Kelly-Frye and Population Frequency Data. In non-DNA cases, the
California Supreme Court has traditionally admitted population frequency
data without a Kelly-Frye inquiry."

After a review of these cases,

however, the Court of Appeals in People v. Axell refused to admit DNA
population frequency statistics without a Kelly-Frye inquiry.

6

Although

the Axell court conducted a Kelly-Frye inquiry, which found the statistical
procedures used to be generally accepted, and admitted the DNA evidence,

it curiously dismissed settled California supreme and appellate court case law
which held methods for calculating population frequency data to be sufficient

229. 802 P.2d. 278 (Cal. 1990).
230. Axell, 235 Cal. App. 3d at 862 ("[T]he [California Supreme] court still listed this third
requirement as a subject of the hearing on admissibility in People v. Kaurish, even though it
stated that careless testing affects the weight of the evidence and not its admissibility in People
v. Cooper.") (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
231. A process where cellular components withdrawn from biological evidence are
separated.
232. Kaurish, 802 P.2d 278, 318 (Cal. 1990); see Axell, 235 Cal. App. 3d at 862.
233. People v. Cooper, 809 P.2d 865, 908 (Cal. 1991) ("mhe Kelly/Frye rule tests the
fundamental validity of a new scientific methodology, not the degree of professionalism with
which it is applied. Careless testing affects the weight of the evidence and not its admissibility. . . .") (citation omitted) (citing Farmer,765 P.2d at 965)).
234. There are only four published opinions in California (all on the appellate level) which
rule on the admissibility of DNA identification evidence. See Axell, 235 Cal. App. 3d 836;
Barney, 8 Cal. App. 4th 798 (1992); Pizarro, 10 Cal. App. 4th 57; People v. Wallace, 14 Cal.
App. 4th 651 (1993). However, it is important to note that the California Supreme Court
refused to certify for publication the appellate court's discussion of DNA testing in People v.
Littleton. People v. Littleton, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 288, 288 n.* (1992).
235. See People v. Brown, 709 P.2d 440, 464 n.6 (Cal. 1985) (statistical use of
blood/semen stain-typing evidence); People v. Coleman, 459 P.2d 1160, 1289-90 n.23 (Cal.
1988), cert. denied, Coleman v. California, 489 U.S. 1100 (1989) (statistical use of ABO blood
typing evidence).
236. Axell, 235 Cal. App. 3d at 866-67. "Tmhe calculation of statistical probability is an
integral part of the process and the underlying method of arriving at that calculation must muster
pass under Kelly-Frye." Id. (emphasis added). It is important to note that the Axell court found
the 'underlying method" utilized (by Cellmark Diagnostics) in this case to be "generally
accepted" under the Kelly-Frye test. Id. at 868.
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without a Kelly-Frye hearing. 7 In fact, the California Supreme Court in
People v. Brown,"8 a case cited in Axell, specifically noted that population
frequency data was traditionally admitted in both California and other
jurisdictions .239

Furthermore, in a post-Axell, non-DNA decision, the California Supreme
Court in People v. Fierro specifically dismissed a defendant's claim that
population frequency data was inadmissible without a Kelly-Frye hearing.2' 4
The court noted that "[b]oth California and the majority of other jurisdictions
have traditionally admitted statistical blood-group evidence." 24'
Even with the guidance of the supreme court in these non-DNA cases,
Justice Chin of the California Court of Appeals in People v. Barney,
nevertheless agreed with People v. Axell and concluded that population
frequency data calculations must be subject to a Kelly-Frye hearing.242
With Axell's apparently misplaced interpretation of Kelly-Frye in the context
of population frequency data, the Barney court was ripe to find controversy
in the wake of the NRC report. With citations to both the NRC report and
the Science articles, the court found "disagreement between two groups, each
'
significant in both number and expertise."243
Accordingly, the appellate
court found a lack of general acceptance regarding the frequency calculation
method and held the DNA evidence inadmissible. 2 " Remarkably, the court
went beyond whether the admissibility of population frequency data should
be subject to the Kelly-Frye standard. The court determined that the issue

237. Id. at 866-67. See, e.g., People v. Brown, 709 P.2d 440 (Cal. 1985) (statistical
evidence not applicable under the general acceptance test of Kelly or Frye); People v. Gallego,
802 P.2d 169 (Cal. 1990); People v. Yorba, 257 Cal. Rptr. 641 (1989); People v. Coleman, 759
P.2d 1260 (Cal. 1988); People v. Poggi, 753 P.2d 1082 (Cal. 1988). See also People v.
Collins, 438 P.2d 33, 36 (Cal. 1968) (statistical evidence must be "critically examined"
considering the possible unfairness to a defendant which might result from presenting erroneous
methods to a jury).
238. 709 P.2d 440.
239. Id. at 536 n.6.
240. People v. Fierro, 821 P.2d 1302, 1344 (Cal. 1991).
241. Id. (citing People v. Brown, 40 Cal. 3d at 536 n.6). Many other jurisdictions admit
population frequency data without a Frye related hearing. See, e.g., Prater v. State, 820 S.W.2d
429, 439 (Ark. 1991); Martinez v. State, 549 So. 2d 694, 696-97 (Fla. 1989); Caldwell v. State,
393 S.E.2d 436, 444 (Ga. 1990); State v. Montalbo, 828 P.2d 1274, 1282 (Haw. 1992); People
v. Miles, 577 N.E.2d 477, 485 (Ill. 1991); People v. Lipscomb, 574 N.E.2d 1345, 1359-1360
(Ill. App. Ct. 1991); State v. Brown, 470 N.W.2d 30, 33 (Iowa 1991); Smith v. Deppish, 807
P.2d 144, 159 (Kan. 1991); Cobey v. State, 559 A.2d 391, 398 (Ma. Ct. Spec. App. 1989);
People v. Adams, 489 N.W.2d 192, 197-98 (Mich. 1992); People v. Wesley, 589 N.Y.S.2d
197, 201 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992); State v. Pierce, 597 N.E.2d 107, 114-115 (Ohio 1992);
Commonwealth v. Rogers, 605 A.2d 1228, 1236 n.10 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992); Kelly v. State, 824
S.W.2d 568, 574 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992); Satcher v. Commonwealth, 421 S.E.2d 821, 833-34
(Va. 1992); United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786, 799 (2d Cir. 1992).
242. People v. Barney, 8 Cal. App. 4th 798, 823 (1992); see also Pizarro, 10 Cal. App.
4th 57 (questioning whether the statistical significance of a DNA match has been generally
accepted).
243. Barney, 8 Cal. App. 4th at 819; Clarke, supra note 9, at 10.
244. Barney, 8 Cal. App. 4th at 819. The California Supreme Court denied review on
November 25, 1992.
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was whether the NRC's frequency calculation method would eventually be
generally accepted, and if so, then DNA analysis should be admissible in
California. 45 More recently, on March 25, 1993, in another opinion by
Justice Chin, the appellate court in People v. Wallace again subjected
population frequency data calculations to a Kelly-Frye inquiry.2' Justice
Chin found that a "raging" debate still existed among population geneticists
regarding population frequency calculations and held the evidence inadmissible.247

With such reasoning, the California Court of Appeals has seemingly
reached a paradoxical conclusion. Although the Barney court felt that the
significance of a DNA match was the "pivotal element of DNA analysis," to
inform a jury of the probability of such a match was prohibited. 4
However, that conclusion was specifically refuted by the NRC report which
noted that "even with today's technology, which used 3-5 loci, a match
between two DNA patterns can be considered strong evidence that the two
samples came from the same source."249

Thus, the California appellate courts have deviated from the state's
supreme court case law as well as case law from many other states, which
support the admission of population statistics under the multiplication rule
without a Kelly-Frye or similarly related inquiry. 0 At least in DNA cases,
the court of appeals has essentially subjected the methodology of the
multiplication rule to Kelly-Frye." Rather than allowing the statistical
results of the multiplication rule to apply to the evidence's weight, as the
California supreme court has done in blood-typing cases,5 2 the appellate
courts have chosen instead to make the multiplication rule in the DNA
context an issue of admissibility. 3 This is most significant in that agreement over a particular probability is likely to be difficult in any complex
scientific subject.

4

245. Id. at 822.

246. People v. Wallace, 14 Cal. App. 4th 651 (1993).
247. Id. at 659.

248. Barney, 8 Cal. App. 4th at 817, 825 (citing DNA Technology, supra note 15, at 74).
The Court of Appeals in Barney held any evidence of inclusionary DNA test results must be
banned from the jury. Id.
249. DNA Technology, supra note 15, at 74.
250. See supra note 249.
251. See supra text accompanying note 250.
252. See supra note 243.
253. The multiplication rule is not a new or novel technique, although its application to
DNA typing is. Thompson & Ford, supra note 5, at 54; see DNA Technology, supra note 15,
at 77.
254. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2795 (1993)
("arguably, there are no certainties in science.").
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IV. A FORWARD LOOK AT DNA STATISTICAL EVIDENCE

Due to the complexity and significant debate surrounding DNA evidence,
particularly the statistical calculations, its basic value in the truth-seeking
process of our judicial system has been overlooked. Rather than questioning
the gap between the numbers of two opposing scientific groups, courts should
realize that there exists some number that everyone can agree on. Furthermore, even beyond the obviousness of this concept, DNA critics Lewontin
and Hartl have apparently reiterated their original opinion on population
subgroups and inadvertently suffered a major breakdown in their original
argument. 5
A. A Conservative Consensus
Considering the support that the OTA, the NRC, and the vast case law have
given to DNA evidence, there is little doubt that it is strong evidence. 2 6
The only real question, as the court in U.S. v Porter257 stated, is "how

strong?""5 8 The Porter court, which could not find general acceptance
among scientists for the probabilities put forth by the prosecution, noticed the
absence of an inquiry as to whether a consensus existed for a more
conservative number. 259 If the odds against a coincidental match are
substantial, then the jury should know. Yet, the odds "do not have to be
thirty million to one for evidence of the match to be admissible."I Even
with the current questioning surrounding population frequency data, there
remains room for a consensus among scientists with more conservative
numbers.261

Using this line of reasoning and acknowledging the debate between the
scientists over the effect of population subgroups on the multiplication rule,
the court in People v. Mohit22 asked, "[s]houldn't the jury know that there
was a match and that the possibility of the perpetrator being someone other
than the defendant is remote, even if it is difficult to say precisely how
remote?" 3 If one side claimed that the odds of a match are one in one
million and the other side claims that the odds are only one in 100,000, then,
as stated by the Mofit court, "no credible segment of the scientific communi-

255. See infra Part IV.b.
256. See DNA Technology, note 15, at 74 ("a match between two DNA patterns can be
considered strong evidence that the two samples came from the same source.").
257. 618 A.2d 629 (D.C. 1992).
258. Id. at 641.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. See State v. Vandebogart, 616 A.2d 483, 494 (N.H. 1992) (remanding the case to
determine if a consensus could be reached on the NRC's technique).
262. 579 N.Y.S.2d 990 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992.)
263. Id. at 993, 996-98.
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ty would claim that the probability estimates ...

in this case or any other

could be higher than one in 100,000."'4 As such, the Mofit court admitted
the probability calculations based on more conservative numbers than the
prosecution had proposed."
In Caldwell v. State, the prosecution's
experts stated that the odds of a random match were one in 24 million while
the defense experts claimed that the odds were only one in 250,000.6

Finding agreement among all the scientists that the odds were at least in line
with the "more conservative" figure of one in 250,000, the Caldwell court
admitted the evidence.267
The reasoning of the Mofit and Caldwell courts directly applies to the
current scientific debate which seems to center on whether to use calculations
supported by the NRC report versus the calculations used by the FBI and
other labs. There appears to be no reason not to admit at least the more
conservative numbers espoused by the NRC since all those in the field accept
the NRC's calculations-even if some scientist believe them to be too
conservative. As long as some agreed upon number can be put forth which
will help establish the fact in controversy, it should go to the jury to
determine its reliability."6

Excluding DNA evidence entirely, because of disagreement over its
strength, is contrary to our adversarial system of justice. "A criminal trial
is not a game, but a quest for truth."269 Only rarely, should a factual

determination be excluded from jury consideration. With safeguards built in,
the judicial system is designed for the jury to hear and weigh all the relevant
evidence. A vigorous cross-examination, qualification of expert witnesses,
careful instructions on the burden of proof, and contrary evidence from other
experts are all means for DNA evidence to be attacked which allows the jury
to make its own factual determination of reliability.27 If scientific or
specialized knowledge will assist the jury to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue, then an expert should testify.
Unfortunately, the adversarial nature of the justice system has not always
seemed so clear when a court is faced with the complexity of the science

264. Id. at 999.
265. Id.
266. Caldwell v. State, 393 S.E.2d 436, 443-44 (Ga. 1990).
267. Id.; see People v. Wesley, 589 N.Y.S.2d 197, 259 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (holding
the more conservative frequency calculations admissible). But see also United States v. Porter,
618 A.2d 629 (D.C. Ct. App. 1992) (court follows the reasoning from Mofit, but was unable
to find a consensus).
268. Porter, 618 A.2d at 641. For other DNA cases admitting population statistics see
Smith v. Deppish, 807 P.2d 144, 157-59 (Kan. 1991); Martinez v. State, 549 So. 2d 694, 69697 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
269. Porter, 618 A.2d at 640 (quoting Womack v. United States, 350 A.2d 381, 383 (D.C.
1976)).
270. United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786, 800 (2d Cir. 1992); similarly see supra text
accompanying note 147.
271. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2795 (1993).
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behind DNA evidence. In People v. Barney, the California Court of
Appeal's leeriness of juror capability was clear:
[W]e cannot reasonably ask the average juror to decide such arcane
questions as whether genetic substructuring and linkage disequilibrium
preclude use of the Hardy-Weinberg equation and the product rule, when
we ourselves have struggled to grasp these concepts. The result would be
predictable. The jury would simply skip to the bottom line-the only
aspect of the process that is readily understood-and look at the ultimate
expression of match probability, without competently assessing the
reliability
of the process by which the laboratory got to the bottom
272
line.

American jurors, however, are routinely asked to resolve complex issues
involving scientific evidence. Appraisal methodologies in eminent domain
actions, actuarial estimates in wrongful death suits, expert opinions regarding
surgical care in malpractice suits, and expert opinions concerning the proper
functioning of breath alcohol instruments in driving under the influence cases
are some of the many examples where jurors decide questions based on
difficult questions in esoteric fields. 3 Moreover, in United States v.
Jakobetz, the Second Circuit stated, "we do not think that a jury will be so
dazzled or swayed as to ignore evidence suggesting that an experiment was
improperly conducted or that testing procedures have not been established."274
B. Lewontin's & Hart'sReiteration:
As stated earlier, much of the current debate over which statistical
method most accurately reflects the odds of a DNA match stems from a
series of articles in the journal Science. 5 Recently, in the April 23, 1993
issue of Science, Dr. Hartl and Dr. Lewontin responded to attacks on their
article and the NRC report. 6 In their response, Hartl and Lewontin
revised their earlier opinion regarding population substructuring. 27 In
their original article of December 20, 1991, they concluded that the use of
the multiplication rule was unjustified since the existence of subpopulations
marred the results.278 Hart and Lewontin had supported this hypothesis
with test results that led them to state that there is on average one-third more

272. People v. Barney, 8 Cal. App. 4th 798, 817 (1992).
273. See supra note 152.
274. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d at 797.
275. See supratext accompanying notes 61-64.
276. Daniel L. Hart & Richard C. Lewontin, DNA FingerprintingReport (Letter), 260
SCIENCE 473, 474 (1993).
277. Id.; see supra text accompanying note 72.
278. Lewontin & Hartl, supra note 58, at 1748-49.

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol30/iss1/7

30

Kramer: Admissibility of DNA Statistical Data: A Proliferation of Misconc

1993]

ADMISSIBILITY OF DNA STATISTICAL DATA

genetic variation among ethnic groups than there is between races. 279
While still using the same data, they now conclude "that there is approximately as much genetic variation among ethnic groups within major races as
there is among the races. "'

Curiously, their new opinion suggests that

there is approximately one-third more variation among races than among
ethnic groups within major races.281 This reversal of opinion, according
to Dr. Chakraborty, "should be sufficient to illustrate that the effect of
population substructuring has little impact on the significance attached to
DNA profile match found in forensic case analyses."I
Additionally, Hartl and Lewontin argue that their new analysis
demonstrates that current methods of statistical calculations are prejudiced
against the defendant, and "no amount of argument will make them
conservative."'
However, in response to the Lewontin & Hartl letter,
scientists from Yale University pointed out that Lewontin and Hartl were
apparently misled by their inadequate data.' 4 Specifically, they found
Hart's conclusion that using a cognate database will induce a large
upward bias in the estimated probability to be in error. 6 Hartl's data,
they noted, used such small samples that an individual's profile within the
cognate database artificially increased the estimated probability.'
The
small sample size created large correlations among the allele probabilities
which yielded a higher probability in the cognate database than in the
noncognate database 8 Thus, the Yale scientists state that Hartl and
Lewontin "again imbue a statistical artifact with a population genetic meaning
,289

The impact of these recent letters in Science goes to the heart of the

DNA population frequency debate. It was the force behind Lewontin's and
Hartl's original articles and studies back in 1991 that brought attention to the
possible effect of population substructuring on the multiplication rule. 21
Their hypothesis alleged that subgroups share differing genetic structure from
279. Id. at 1747.

280. Hartl & Lewontin, supra note 276, at 474.
281. Id.
282. Ranajit Chakraborty, NCR Report on DNA Typing (Letter), 260 SCIENCE 1059 (1993).
283. Hartl & Lewontin, supra note 276, at 474.
284. B. Devlin et al., NRC Report On DNA Typing (Letter), 260 SCIENCE 1057, 1058
(1993). Devlin et al., chose not to belabor Hartl and Lewontin's first hypothesis since
Chakraborty and Kidd had previously shown Hartl and Lewontin's results to be "artifacts of
using inappropriate data." Id.
285. A "cognate database" matches the DNA type with a database of the same ethnic group,
i.e., an Italian DNA profile would use a database made up of Italians.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id. The scientists went on to state the NRC's proposed study of population
substructure, using small sample sizes, would be inadequate for the same reasons. Id.
290. See Lewontin & Hartd, supra note 58; DNA Technology, supra note 13, at 80 & n.10;
see also People v. Barney, 8 Cal. App. 4th 798, 818-20 (1992).
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the rest of the population which, if not considered, invalidates the results of
the multiplication rule. From such a hypothesis, they vigorously opposed
current DNA identification methods which has led courts now to question
and even reject DNA evidence. The importance of Lewontin and Hart's
article is evidenced by the judicial reliance on it.291 In People v. Barney,
the court reviewed Lewontin's and Hartl's hypothesis and its criticism by
Chakraborty and Kidd and subsequently stated that the debate "changes the
scientific landscape considerably, and demonstrates indisputably that there is
no general acceptance of the current process." 2' The Barney court found
that the studies and opinion by Lewontin and Hartd had "eclipsed" the court's
finding in Axell that there was general acceptance for the population
frequency calculations. In U.S. v. Porter, the trial court held the DNA
evidence inadmissible noting the "substantial controversy among distinguished scientists as to the soundness of certain assumptions on which [the
frequency] calculation was predicated. 294
Lewontin's and Hart's recent reversal of opinion represents
a major breakdown in their population substructuring theory. By saying that
there is at least as much genetic variation among ethnic groups as there is
among major races, Lewontin and Hartl have abandoned the idea that
subgroups affect the multiplication rule. Essentially, their data yields the
same conclusion that Chakraborty, Kidd and the NRC committee found-any
effect of population substructure on the multiplication rule's reliability is
negligible. 95 The judicial impact of Lewontin's and Hartl's revised
opinion has yet to be felt. Over the last two years, the debate, which has led
courts to find a lack of general acceptance, has centered around their original
contention that subpopulations vary more than major races. Their reversal
will likely impact the future debate regarding population substructure and
DNA evidence.
Furthermore, Dr. Chakraborty responded with new data in the May 21,
1993 issue of Science to Hartl and Lewontin's letter of April 23.296
Chakraborty cited new studies which examined the regional differences
within racial groups more closely in regard to DNA markers. These new
studies support the earlier opinion, with which Hartl and Lewontin now
agree, that genetic differentiation among subgroups has a negligible effect on

291. See, e.g., Barney, 8 Cal. App. 4th at 818-20.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 820-21.
294. United States v. Porter, 618 A.2d 629, 636 (D.C. App. Ct. 1992). For other decisions
excluding DNA evidence due to the controversy behind the Lewontin and Hartl article see
Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 596 N.E.2d 311, 315-16 (Mass. 1992); State v. Vandebogart, 616
A.2d 483, 493-94 (N.H. 1992); State v. Houser, 490 N.W.2d 168, 182-85 (Neb. 1992).
295. See DNA Technology, supra note 15, at 80. See also Chakraborty & Kidd, supra note

43, at 1738.
296. Chakraborty, supra, note 282, at 1059.
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the multiplication rule.2" Such data, Chakraborty states, "appears to
provide adequate justification for the current forensic practice in relation to
legal applications of DNA typing."29 In addition, initial data from these
studies indicates that variation between individual DNA profiles is so large
that it "dwarfs" any differences between populations.299 This conclusion
supports the independency of allele frequencies needed for the multiplication
rule. In fact, based on this data, Chakraborty concluded that the rarity of
each multilocus DNA sequence "virtually eliminates the possibility of
miscarriage of justice when a match is observed over three or more
loci." 3°
CONCLUSION

Since DNA evidence was first used in the American court system in
1986, critics have questioned its reliability. Initially, the soundness and the
theory behind DNA technology was challenged. Disproved, and DNA
theory intact, critics have tried in recent years to attack the probabilities
associated with a DNA match. Finding a group of well-qualified genetic
scientists with a small amount of preliminary data indicating that DNA
probability matches may not be as extreme as thought, critics have propelled
these scientists and their opinions to the forefront of DNA admissibility.
At the forefront, judges must decide whether to admit the DNA evidence
or to subject it to an admissibility standard, such as the Frye standard.
Although several courts have admitted DNA evidence and its frequency data
without such an inquiry, many other courts have considered the frequency
data an integral part of DNA evidence and subjected it to a Frye-like inquiry.
In spite of this, these same courts will admit, without a Frye hearing, the
expert testimony and test results in non-DNA cases, such as, a blood alcohol
test where the margin of error can vary greatly from person to person. The
court will then admit the results and leave the probability of error to the
weight of the evidence. Why should the result be any different with DNA
evidence?
Although DNA evidence may be complex, and even questionable to
many people, that does not justify its inadmissibility. The justice system was
designed for juries to be able to hear relevant, but possibly questionable
scientific evidence. The qualification of experts, an extensive crossexamination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instructions on
the burden of proof are all means to attack DNA evidence and its probabilities. Withholding DNA evidence altogether, because expert opinions may

297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. Id.
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differ on the odds of match, is contrary to the fact-finding function of the
jury and the truth seeldng nature of the justice system.
In addition, it should not be overlooked, that the NRC report, which has
received so much judicial deference, could not upon its own inquiry find any
appreciable effect of subpopulations on the multiplication rule. Moreover,
scientists such as Lewontin and Hartl, who helped create most of the current
debate on population frequencies, have suffered a major breakdown in their
original hypothesis. Upon closer study of their original data, they have
reiterated what their opponents, such as Chakraborty and Kidd have been
saying all along: that subpopulations vary genetically as much as the larger
populations thus having a negligible effect on DNA population frequencies.
Finally, no one is disputing that some number should be admitted. As
far as a reasonable doubt is concerned, there is really very little difference
between one in a million and one in 100 million, or one in a million and one
in a 100,000. Furthermore, when experts disagree on a number, why not
allow the jury to see the more conservative number. This is only common
sense. For example, if prosecution experts were to testify that the chance of
a duplicate DNA match was one in two million, but defense experts testified
that the odds of a match are closer to one in 200,000, certainly the
prosecution experts would agree that the chance of a match is at least as
small as a one in 200,000. Either way, the statistical evidence assists with
the strength of the evidence and should go to the jury. There is no
requirement that the odds of a coincidental DNA match need to be 50 million
to one for it to be admissible. Such a view stigmatizes DNA evidence as the
magic bullet-which it is not. What it is, and remains, is "a highly discriminating, very reliable piece of evidence." 3"'
R. Stephen Kramer

301. Sherman, supra, note 6, at 30 (Statement of John Hicks, Director of the F.B.I. Crime

Laboratory).
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